Physical and social warmth

Abstract The concept of a warm person has played a key role in western social psychological research, particularly in how people perceive others. Williams and Bargh (2008; Study 1) found that individuals holding a cup of warm beverage perceived the individuals they faced as psychologically warmer than those who held a cup of cold beverage. In this article, we set out to replicate and extend these findings by exploring whether various factors modify the effect of physical and social warmth.

Self-Distancing Regulates the Effect of Incidental Anger (vs. Fear) on Affective Decision-Making Under Uncertainty

Emotions integral to a task are often adaptive, particularly in situations where outcomes and probabilities are not known. However, decisions are also influenced by emotions that arise from situations unrelated to the task. This is especially the case with negative emotions like fear and anger, which also tend to be accompanied by ruminative thinking that might divert decision-makers’ attention from the task at hand. In two preregistered experiments, we show how self-distancing regulates the influence of incidental anger (vs. fear) on decision-making under uncertainty. Participants recalled and reflected on a fear-related or anger-related event from either a self-immersed or self-distanced perspective. Next, they completed a task that is commonly used to measure affective decision-making under uncertainty, the Iowa Gambling Task. The results in both experiments indicated that self-immersed angry (vs. fearful) decision-makers were significantly slower to avoid the risky, disadvantageous decks. These findings demonstrate how the ways in which we process negative emotional events shape their carryover effects in decision-making under uncertainty and point to self-distancing as a potential tool to control incidental emotional influences.

Revisiting representativeness classic paradigms: Replication and extensions of the problems reviewed in Kahneman and Tversky (1972)

Abstract Kahneman and Tversky (1972) showed that when people make probability judgments, they tend to ignore relevant statistical information (e.g., sample size) and instead rely on a representativeness heuristic, whereby subjective probabilities are influenced by the degree to which a target is perceived as similar to (representative of) a typical example of the relevant population, class or category. Their paper has become a cornerstone in many lines of research and has been used to account for various biases in judgment and decision-making.

Uncertainty, expertise, and persuasion: A replication and extension of Karmarkar and Tormala (2010)

Abstract If you are trying to persuade someone, expressing your opinion with certainty intuitively seems like a good strategy to maximize your influence. However, Karmarkar and Tormala (2010) found that the effectiveness of this tactic depends on expertise. In three experiments, Karmarkar and Tormala found support for an incongruity hypothesis, whereby non-expert sources can gain interest and influence by expressing certainty, while expert sources can increase persuasion by expressing uncertainty.

The Dark Versus Bright Side of a Smiley: A Preregistered Replication of Experiment 3 in Glikson et al. (2018)

The present paper reports an independent and better powered replication of Experiment 3 in Glikson et al. (2018). The authors of the original study reported support for their proposition that due to perceptions of (in)appropriateness, the use of smileys may backfire and produce less favorable perceptions of competence in a formal work-related setting, yet more favorable perceptions of warmth in an informal work-related setting. Our results, in contrast, indicated that smileys produce a negative effect on perceptions of competence and a positive effect on perceptions of warmth, regardless of the level of formality. Moreover, our results did not support the reported moderated mediation model involving perceptions of appropriateness. Potential explanations for the discrepancies in results are discussed. We provide data, code, and materials.

Individual Differences in Fear and Self-Distancing Predict Information Processing via Problem Construal

Abstract In two preregistered online studies (NTotal = 984; Prolific), we examined how individual differences in fear and self-distancing predict information processing in decision-making involving risk in a business scenario. Dispositional fear was positively related to urgent and affective intuitive processing and negatively related to analytical processing. Self-distancing was positively related to analytical processing. These relations occurred indirectly via problem construal. Dispositional fear predicted less concrete problem construal, which in turn predicted more urgent intuitive processing and less analytical processing.

Open-office noise and information processing

Abstract We draw on arousal-based models to develop and test a model of open-office noise and information processing. Specifically, we examined whether open-office noise changes how people process information and whether such a change has consequences for task performance. In a laboratory experiment, we randomly assigned participants (107 students at a business school) to either a silent condition or a condition that exposed them to open-office noise (irrelevant speech) while completing a task that requires cognitive flexibility.

Fear and anxiety differ in construal level and scope

The fear-anxiety distinction has been extensively discussed and debated among emotion researchers. In this study, we tested this distinction from a social-cognitive perspective. Drawing on construal level theory and regulatory scope theory, we examined whether fear and anxiety differ in their underlying level of construal and scope. Results from a preregistered autobiographical recall study (N = 200) that concerned either a fear situation or an anxiety situation and a large dataset from Twitter (N = 104,949) indicated that anxiety was associated with a higher level of construal and a more expansive scope than fear. These findings support the notion that emotions serve as mental tools that deal with different challenges. While fear prompts people to seek immediate solutions to concrete threats in the here and now (contractive scope), anxiety prompts them to deal with distant and unknown threats that require more expansive and flexible solutions (expansive scope). Our study contributes to a growing literature on emotions and construal level and points to interesting avenues for further research.

Speakers’ Choice of Frame Reveals Little about Their Trait Emotions but More about Their Preferences and Risk Perception

Abstract People’s decisions depend on how situations are described or framed to them. But how do speakers frame outcomes to others? What factors predict whether a speaker chooses to frame an investment opportunity in terms of its chances of failure or success? Drawing on the appraisal tendency framework, we investigated whether emotions associated with uncertainty (worry) might increase speakers’ preference for negative framing, whereas emotions associated with certainty (anger) might increase speakers’ preference for positive framing.

National identity predicts public health support during a global pandemic

Abstract Changing collective behaviour and supporting non-pharmaceutical interventions is an important component in mitigating virus transmission during a pandemic. In a large international collaboration (Study 1, N = 49,968 across 67 countries), we investigated selfreported factors associated with public health behaviours (e.g., spatial distancing and stricter hygiene) and endorsed public policy interventions (e.g., closing bars and restaurants) during the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic (April-May 2020). Respondents who reported identifying more strongly with their nation consistently reported greater engagement in public health behaviours and support for public health policies.

Fear from Afar, Not So Risky After All. Distancing Moderates the Relationship Between Fear and Risk Taking

A Replication of Study 1 in Differentiating Social and Personal Power by Lammers, Stoker, and Stapel (2009)

We performed an independent, direct, and better powered (N = 295) replication of Study 1, an experiment (N = 113) by Lammers, Stoker, and Stapel (2009). Lammers and colleagues distinguished between social power (influence over others) and personal power (freedom from the influence of others), and found support for their predictions that the two forms of power produce opposite effects on stereotyping, but parallel effects on behavioral approach. Our results did not replicate the effects on behavioral approach, but partially replicated the effects on stereotyping. Compared to personal power, social power produced less stereotyping, but neither form of power differed significantly from the control condition, and effect sizes were considerably lower than the original estimates. Potential explanations are discussed.